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ABSTRACT. In this paper
1
, we address the problem of irony compre-
hension. Despite the differences about the complexity involved in 
irony processing, all theories of irony recognized the importance of 
context to understand the ironic intention. The paper considers, in 
particular, the role of social stereotypes as contextual information in 
on-line comprehension of ironic utterances. We argue that the ca-
pacity for Naïve Sociology is required in irony processing and that 
this capacity should interact with the capacity for Naïve Psychology 
in order to integrate the understanding of ironic intention with social 
stereotypical information coming from the context.   
 
                                                          
1 This work is the outcome of a collaborative effort. However, for the specific concerns of 
Italian academy, the first and the second paragraphs were written by Francesca Ervas and sup-
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FondaMental and Fondation Orange. We wish to thank our collaborators: Maud Champagne 
(Laboratoire Parole et Langage, CNRS, Université de Aix-en-Provence), Marion Leboyer, Re-
sponsible for the Psychiatric Department, Albert Chenevier Hospital, Creteil (Paris), Evelyn 
Herbrecht and Frederique Ansellem (Psychiatric Department, Albert Chenevier Hospital, 
Creteil). 
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1.  What is irony? 
 
The study of irony is plagued by problems of defining similar subcategories of 
a broad class of humorous phenomena, which are often described by impre-
cise folk-terms such as humor, sarcasm, funny, laughable, ridiculous, etc.. 
Irony is generally seen as distinct from humor and precisely defined, in Clas-
sical Rethoric and Standard-Gricean Pragmatic View, as conveying the oppo-
site meaning from what is said.  
A complete understanding of an ironic utterance, such as “See what a love-
ly weather!” pronounced in a rainy day, is a quite complex and difficult pro-
cess. Some well-known everyday misunderstandings and the need to ask to 
the speaker whether she is joking or not, in order to better understand what 
she really meant, testify the fact that the literal meaning could be sometimes 
considered as a plausible interpretation of the ironic utterance pronounced, 
even if contextually irrelevant or inappropriate. 
In the Salience-based hypothesis framework, Giora argued that, in spite of 
contextual information, the “so-called irrelevant meanings are activated be-
cause they are salient” (Giora and Gur 2003, p. 299), i.e. the most frequent, 
familiar, conventional and prototypical/stereotypical meanings stored in our 
mental lexicon (Giora 2003). It would be exactly the initial activation of in-
compatible, literal interpretations that makes the ironic utterances comprehen-
sion a so difficult and mistake-prone process.  
If irony comprehension involves a two-stages processing of both literal 
and ironic meanings, this should be reflected in processing times longer than 
those required by understanding literal utterances. This conclusion is anyway 
highly controversial: some recent findings supported Giora’s hypothesis in 
this sense (Dews and Winner 1999), but other empirical evidence showed that 
ironic utterances take no longer to be processed than literal utterances (Gibbs 
1994). 
These latter results would be instead a proof in favor of a one-stage irony 
comprehension process, as that hypothesized by the Echoic Mention Theory 
(Sperber and Wilson 1986) or the Allusional Pretense Theory (Kreuz and 
Glucksberg 1989). According to Giora, claiming that irony comprehension is 
a one-stage process, those theories would make ironic language use “as easy 
to understand as literal language” (Giora 1995, p. 240). However the data 
could also support theories, such as the Joint Pretense Theory (Clark 1996) 
and the Tinge Hypothesis (Dews and Winner 1999), claiming that understand-
ing of irony is a one-stage, but two-layered simultaneous process of both lit-
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eral and ironic meanings (see Giora 2003 for a review of contemporary theo-
ries of irony).  
As Curcò noted, “it is possible to conceive of a very complex single stage, 
so that even if irony comprehension should take place in one single stage […], 
it is not a necessary conclusion that it is as easy to interpret as nonfigurative 
language” (Curcò 2000, p. 267). The number of stages involved in the pro-
cessing of irony would not necessarily connected to its difficulty of compre-
hension. 
 
 
 
2.  Social-contextual cues to irony comprehension 
 
Despite the differences about the complexity involved in the processing of 
irony, all the theories recognized the importance of context to understand the 
ironic intention. The kind of context required for irony understanding seems 
to be a wider context conceived as a “complex configuration of shared 
knowledge, beliefs, values, and communicative strategies” (Hutcheon 1994, p. 
91) adopted by social communities.  
As regards to speakers, for instance, Kreuz and Caucci (2009) listed a 
number of contextual elements which encourage an ironic interpretation, such 
as the presence of people prone to use irony (Ivanko et al. 2004), or coming 
from a region where irony is one of the most common communicative strate-
gies (Dress et al. 2008). Speaker’s gender seems to be a cue to ironic interpre-
tation, because men are considered more likely to use verbal irony than wom-
en (Colston and Lee 2004), but also some speaker’s occupations could be 
considered more prone to sarcasm than others, as for instance a comedian or 
an actor (Pexman and Olineck 2002a). 
Katz and Pexman inserted speakers’ occupation in the context of ironic ut-
terance, both because “occupation is an indicator of the speaker’s social sta-
tus” and “a variable that conveys the speaker’s social knowledge” (Pexman et 
al. 2000, p. 203). Indeed, speaker’s occupation has been shown to influence 
not only the interpretation of figurative meaning in general (Holtgraves 1994), 
but also the interpretation of ironic intention in particular.  
Following the above mentioned studies on speaker occupation as a cue to 
either ironic or metaphoric interpretation (Pexman et al. 2000), Pexman and 
Olineck (2002a) suggested that “people shared beliefs about the linguistic 
tendencies of different social groups and that those beliefs influence perceived 
communicative intent” (Pexman and Olineck 2002a, p. 270).  
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Moreover, Katz, Blasko and Kazmerski forcefully showed that the emer-
gence of sarcasm is produced by a character in the context making a statement 
incongruent with events in the story (Katz et al. 2004). Multiple sources of in-
formation are conjointly exploited when a listener attempts to understand an 
ironic utterance and social stereotypes contribute to the facilitation effect, as 
the response times testify: “when the discourse context is congruent with a 
sarcastic interpretation, the target sentence is read more rapidly if it is made 
by a person from a high-irony occupation rather than a person from a low-
irony occupation” (Katz et al. 2004, p. 187).  
As in Pexman and Olineck (2002b), these results could be correlated with 
the specific traits of speakers’ occupation activated in irony interpretation or 
their perceived tendencies to be more humorous, to mock or criticize, to be 
less sincere and to have a lower occupation level, but also to be more polite 
and positive in case of ironic insults, the most spread form of sarcasm. These 
features contribute to set up an “ironic situation” and to detect speaker’s mock 
disappointment. 
According to Hirschfeld (2001), contextual information is processed into 
social categories in order to both reduce the quantity of information and ex-
tend our knowledge of social world by capturing similarities among their 
members. These taxonomies become social stereotypes which provide a basis 
for predicting the behavior of others and interpreting their utterances (Dovidio 
2001). Social stereotypes are part of the folk theory known as “Naïve Sociol-
ogy”, the spontaneous human mechanism for understanding of social groups 
and social relations, active from an early stage of children development.  
In other words, “Naïve Sociology” is a natural way to make sense of our 
own intuitions about the social world around us. According to Hirschfeld, data 
coming from recent studies on the use of social stereotypes would show that 
“Naïve Sociology” is a preserved ability in individuals with autism spectrum 
disorders (ASD) and that it is distinct from “Naïve Psychology”, the natural 
human ability to infer and reason about other people’s mental states (Hirsch-
feld et al. 2007).  
Despite the severe social impairments, recent findings have indeed shown 
that adults with ASD are sensitive to stereotypes on genre, race and age 
(Hamilton and Krendl 2007), they have preserved abilities in attributing social 
stereotypes to people’s faces (White et al. 2006) and that children with autism 
perform as well as children with typical development in using stereotypes to 
predict the outcomes of new contexts (Hirschfeld et al. 2007). 
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3.  Irony comprehension in autism 
 
It is not hard to imagine that verbal irony is one of the most difficult commu-
nicative tasks for people, such as individuals with ASD, who are impaired not 
only in deriving the figurative meaning of an utterance exploiting contextual 
information (Ting Wang et al. 2006), but also in social tasks that require an 
higher-order mentalizing ability. Difficulty in appreciating irony is widely re-
ported in individuals with ASD (Martin and McDonald 2004; Kaland et al. 
2005). 
Happé (1993) found a correlation between metarepresentational and com-
municative abilities: subjects who failed the first-order false-belief test were 
able to understand simile but not metaphor and irony, subjects who passed 
first-order false-belief test but failed second-order false-belief test, understood 
metaphor, but not irony, while those who passed the second-order false-belief 
test did understand irony. However, individuals with ASD who failed all the 
false-belief tests were found to have significantly lower verbal IQ than those 
who passed them, while other studies showed that individuals with Asperger 
Syndrome (AS), selected for their normal verbal IQ, performed as well as 
controls on even second-order tests (Ozonoff et al. 1991).  
Happé (1994) explained these results as a function of alternative non-
mentalistic strategies, which could explain why individuals with AS are any-
way socially impaired. She further argued that the alternative cognitive strate-
gy used by subjects with AS may be verbal in nature, concluding that “autistic 
people who (probably with significant delays) become able to understand a 
character’s false belief may be using verbally mediated routes not used by 
normal or non-autistic mentally handicapped individuals” (Happé 1995, p. 
853).  
As a result, testing irony comprehension in subjects having theory of mind 
impairments without language delay, had become important to understand 
what kind of deficit autism involved in both metarepresentational and com-
municative abilities. Jolliffe and Baron-Cohen (1999) tested adults with both 
AS and high functioning autism (HFA, characterised by a history of speech 
and language delay), confirming their ability to provide mental state answers 
but their weakness in processing mental state information in contextually ap-
propriate situations.  
Anyway, against Happé’s hypothesis of a correlation between performance 
on false-beliefs tasks and verbal mental age, their study revealed no perfor-
mance difference between HFA and AS groups: “The fact that there were no 
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significant differences between groups suggests that the presence or absence 
of early language delay did not differentiate the two groups” (Jolliffe and 
Baron-Cohen 1999, p. 404). 
 
 
 
4.  Irony and social stereotypes in autism 
 
A recent study investigated how irony is socially perceived and whether 
social stereotypes facilitate understanding of irony in a group of adults with 
HFA/AS by using a series of verbally presented stories containing either an 
ironic or a literal utterance. The experiment had two main objectives: 1) to as-
sess whether individuals with HFA/AS understand ironic utterances (i.e. ut-
terances conveying the opposite to what is literally said); 2) to test the hy-
pothesis that stereotypical contextual knowledge influences not only the per-
ception of irony in individuals with HFA/AS, but also their perception of iro-
ny in its main communicative functions: mockery, politeness and positive-
ness. 
In spite of their longer response time, individuals with HFA/AS performed 
as well as the comparison group in recognizing ironic utterances. Moreover, 
both groups exhibit an overall similar image of irony: ironic utterances are 
generally perceived as more mocking, but also more polite and positive com-
pared with literal utterances. Interestingly, the results also show that when a 
character in the story has a job stereotypically considered as sarcastic, com-
prehension of ironic utterances improved in terms of accuracy, only in com-
parison group. 
These results suggest that individuals with HFA/AS have difficulties in in-
tegrating stereotypical knowledge with information coming from the under-
standing of ironic intention. Subjects with HFA/AS fail to integrate social ste-
reotypical knowledge when it is implicit in the context, whereas comparison 
subjects seem to use it in a natural, unconscious and automatic way. On the 
contrary, subjects with HFA/AS are able to use it in contexts where an explicit 
use of social stereotypical contents is made (White et al. 2006, Hamilton and 
Krendl 2007), i.e. where they can use what they have learnt about social 
groups, rather than what they automatically infer about them.  
Therefore, it could be hypothesized that HFA/AS individuals’ well-known 
gap between contextual information and understanding of speaker’s intention 
could be due to a missing integration of encyclopedic knowledge coming 
from social stereotypes. Their longer response time could be due to a difficul-
THE ROLE OF “NAÏVE SOCIOLOGY” IN IRONY COMPREHENSION 
 
 
 
451 
ty in integrating information coming from the capacity for Naïve Sociology 
and the capacity for Naïve Psychology in irony comprehension. This also 
means that Naïve Sociology should interact with Naïve Psychology in people 
with typical development in the processing of social-contextual information 
which seems to largely constrain the interpretation of ironic utterances. 
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